



# The Dialectic Of Interpretation In History

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## ABSTRACT

The definition of history as rational knowledge stems from the work of the historian and his relationship with history. This is because the historian does not approach history alone, but deals with it in the presence of epistemological means directed towards his research. The question "Why did events happen the way they did?" guides the entire research statement and necessarily reveals the extent of the historian's particular interest, a general commitment to all scientific and historical standards, as well as the values of his or her present and society. The solution to the problem of historical truth must therefore be formulated in the light of all that the historian has gathered on the subject he has chosen and of the intellectual adventure of the cognizant self.

It is therefore necessary to hasten to explain that history, in its effort to grasp the object accurately and completely, does not cease to be concerned with understanding and reinforcing it with a certain meaning and within certain limits by means of interpretation. Despite the mixture of things that the documents reveal to us, or the dust of primary minor facts, analysis discovers the category of the particular to which history belongs. And in spite of incidental events and coincidences, there are historical truths.

**Keywords:** History, epistemology, historical truth, interpretation, historical facts.

## INTRODUCTION

There are a number of important questions that have attracted the attention of analytic philosophers, centred on causal intrusion in historical explanations, their effectiveness, and the problem of objectivity in history.

The latter question is situated between two scales: experience, since history is not cold knowledge but a translation of a past experience into the present, it is the memory of humanity. And since the historian is human, he is an integral part of history, and in this case it is human consciousness that provides him with a guide for his constantly evolving thoughts. Can we speak of an underlying causal coherence of historical events? Or are they the result of a series of mechanisms that link the past to the future, so that the existence of certain events leads to the creation of certain conditions?

How can the historian narrate and reconstruct historical facts and events without reflecting their own truths? What are the necessary conditions for achieving objectivity in understanding the other, without making the specificity of individuality and change in history an obstacle to its realisation?

In order to achieve this goal, the historian finds himself in a dialectic between the artist-historian and the scholar-historian, because the process of reconstructing history does not necessarily contradict the process of the poet or the novelist, except in that the historian's imagination is anxiously subordinated to historical facts. The historian must also be satisfied with the judgement of evidence as an experience that benefits the present and outlines the line of the future. This dialectical truth as the nature of interpreting history reveals another truth, that historical facts are human actions and practices, a reality and not a fantasy, recorded by history as lived by human beings. At this level, the scholar-historian's insistence on competence, accuracy and objectivity, either by applying the methods and theories of the natural sciences, or by trying to find methods appropriate to the specificity of history.

The principle of causality, as the epistemology and logic of positivist science, is the first stage in the dialectic of interpretation in history. What is the value of this principle in science first and in history second?

### First: The Necessity of Causality in Science:

The idea of science is linked to a web of causal relations that puts the world in human hands. It is both the basis and the source of science and its method, despite the ambiguity that surrounds this word, whether at the level of source<sup>\*12</sup> or function<sup>\*\*3</sup>. Whatever its source, the necessity of causality has been present since the birth of science, and we have no right to question its legitimacy or lack of it, because the position of the problem takes an inverted course during scientific activity itself: For the methodology of science is to search for the presence in phenomena of what leads us to the knowledge of causes, that is, to identify the subjects that constitute science.

In this context, it should be pointed out that science in physics - not to be confused with philosophical causal interpretation - deals with causality within its very narrow limits, that is, with known elements in reality. This means that scientific subjects are defined by the recurrent relations chosen on the basis of their principle of being able to bear causality. The world without subjects that can be known and followed in time is non-existent for science.

The individual subjects, in their composition and nature, allow the changing phenomena that leave room for imagination and probabilities to play a major role in the weaving of the factor of chance in their occurrence. Science, on the other hand, works hard to connect these subjects with the thread of causality in order to arrive at the truth. What is the role of history in causal interpretation? And what are its limits?

### Second - The Necessity of Causality in History

The purpose of identifying causes in history is to enable man to recognise the difference between scientific history and popular narrative, and to determine historical truth in an "objective" way, without leaving room for superstition or imagination to play a role in the construction of history. The interest in history based on causes and effects is linked to the degree of stability of these causes in the interpretation, so that it does not become merely a vessel filled with various changing, shifting and hollow words. There must also be a logic that organises the historical process, and one who does not concern himself with these causes and effects, as 'Umar Farrukh says, "descends on the ladder of logic until he becomes a storyteller"<sup>4</sup>.

The core of historical logic is the training of the mind to deal with the question of cause and effect, which the historian encounters at every turn. Historians almost unanimously agree that the ultimate aim of history is a rational one, related in one way or another to the advancement of understanding, and not entertainment, which is a secondary aim.

Ibn Khaldun sees history as dynamic movement and growth, not static and stagnant.<sup>5</sup> "One of the hidden errors in history is the obliviousness to the change of conditions in nations and generations with the passing of ages and days, which is a deeply hidden disease. This is because it only becomes apparent after long periods of time, and is seldom perceived except by a few of the elite of humanity. This is because the conditions of the world and the nations, their customs and beliefs, do not persist in a single consistent pattern and stable method. Rather, there is a change from day to day and from time to time, a transition from one state to another. And just as this happens with individuals, times and regions, so it happens with horizons<sup>6</sup>.

This characteristic, in Ibn Khaldun's view, distinguishes history from other traditional sciences and heightens the need to understand it in its own right and in all its richness - that is, to uncover the natural laws that drive the universe and determine the course of history.

Ibn Khaldun begins by extolling the art of history, noting that "although on the surface it is no more than an account of days and dynasties... inwardly it is reflection and verification, a meticulous analysis of (natural) entities and their principles... and it is also an ancient source of wisdom"<sup>7</sup>.

He thus combines history and explanation - that is, understanding through the study of causes.

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\* Philosophers have disagreed about the nature of causality. David Hume said: "It is a habit formed of phenomena by their succession in time, and familiarity with this succession has led to the association of phenomena on the basis of cause and effect".

<sup>1</sup>- Janet, P. (1934). *The beginnings of intelligence*. Paris, p.160.

<sup>2</sup> - Immanuel Kant. (1987). *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Musa Wahba. Centre for National Development, p.280-281.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Opinions differ on the role of causality in the construction of a scientific system of knowledge, especially since this concept has been used extensively in philosophy to determine the nature of existence through its ultimate causes. This, I believe, has widened the gap between those who associate the birth of science with the relationships between phenomena and those who reject this term and adopt the concept of the relationship between relatively stable scientific facts.

<sup>3</sup>- Mach, E. (1908). *Knowledge and Error: On the Elimination of Causality by Function*, p. 212.

<sup>4</sup>- Omar Farroukh. (1988). *A word on the explanation of history*. Beirut: Dar Al-Ilm Lil-Malayin, p.04.

<sup>5</sup>- Tareeq Al-Khaldi. (1982). *A Study on the Concept and Methodology of History*. Beirut: Dar Al-Tali'ah for Printing and Publishing, p.69.

<sup>6</sup>- Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun. (2001). *The Muqaddimah*. Beirut: Dar Al-Arqam for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, p.60.

<sup>7</sup>- The same reference, p.66.

Ibn Khaldun therefore becomes the optimal starting point for the historian, because this text provides the most important measure in the search for the causes of great, even complex events, which in my view also produce complex results.

In this way, Ibn Khaldun occupies the most exalted position among human thinkers, simply by virtue of his desire to understand the reality he experienced. This desire to show that history is not just stories, but a description of the entire social environment, including its movements, manifestations, civilisation, culture and art, means that the historian must be versed in various sciences and diverse knowledge in order to uncover the laws of nature or, as he calls them, "the nature of (social) entities or the nature of conditions in civilisation"<sup>8</sup>.

It was not until the 19th century that the West became familiar with Ibn Khaldun's (Introduction), as Henry Marrou points out in his work "On Historical Knowledge": "We pointed out at the beginning of this study that historical knowledge, with its astonishing richness, is not obliged from the outset to reflect the clamorous truth of the past. On the contrary, it also has the ambition, or rather the aim, of extracting from it a certain rationality... We must therefore hasten to point out that history, in its effort to grasp its object precisely and to integrate it as much as possible, does not cease to be interested in "understanding"... in a certain sense and within certain limits, in "interpreting"<sup>9</sup>.

It was only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the West was able to lay the foundations of modern historical science, despite the fact that Herodotus, the "father of history", began his work by saying "to preserve the memory of the actions of the Greeks and the barbarians, and above all to explain the causes of their wars."<sup>10</sup> Even his pupil Thucydides was accused in antiquity of lacking a clear concept of causality.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of Western writings on the principles that establish the scientificity and rationality of history, the pioneering civilisational and scientific contributions of "Ibn Khaldun" remain, especially his statement in his introduction: "

But the breakthrough came with Montesquieu<sup>11</sup> in his "Reflections on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline" and "The Spirit of the Laws", where he argued that "there are general causes, moral or material, which act in every kingdom, raising it, maintaining it, or overthrowing it; and that all that happens is subject to these causes"<sup>12</sup>. He also commented that "it is foolish to believe that blind fate has produced all the effects we see in the world... for men do not submit to the judgments of their fancy alone, but their conduct follows certain laws or principles derived from the nature of things"<sup>13</sup>.

Notwithstanding the proliferation of Western writings on the principles that establish the scientificity and rationality of history, the pioneering civilisational and scientific contributions of "Ibn Khaldun" remain, especially his statement in his introduction: "As if this were an independent discipline, for it has a subject, which is human civilisation and human social organisation, and it has problems, which are the explanation of the accidents and conditions that befall it, one after another. This is the nature of every science, whether empirical or rational... And know that the discourse to this end is of a novel craft, of a strange tendency, of abundant utility, which research has stumbled upon and diving has led to..."<sup>14</sup>.

History, therefore, achieves rationality only to the extent that it seems capable of revealing the links that connect each stage of human destiny with its antecedents and its consequences, i.e. the existence of rational connections between successive moments in time, because the question that follows the historian like his shadow is "why?", because every event occurs by virtue of the preparation of the conditions and causes that lead to its occurrence, and this is the basis of its rationality, because there is no room for doubt about its occurrence, and every statement that reflects this purpose sets a limit to historical knowledge<sup>15</sup>.

As "Edwarikaar" says in his lecture on the concept of history: "The historian constantly asks why. And he cannot stop as long as he hopes for an answer. The great historian - or perhaps I should speak more broadly and say the great thinker - is the man who asks 'why' about new things or in new environments"<sup>16</sup>.

So what is the nature of cause in history, and what is its specificity?

### **Third, the nature of cause in history:**

The one certain truth is that the cause in history is individual and specific. This truth appears clearly in the concept, which has multiplied to the point of ambiguity and contradiction.

In science, the term "cause" retains its meaning throughout the investigation and to the end. For example, when we say that "the effect of a certain type of bacteria or the distance between certain stars may vary in the

<sup>8</sup> - Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, previous reference, pp.66-67.

<sup>9</sup> - Henri Marrou. (1971). On Historical Knowledge. Egypt: The General Egyptian Book Organisation, Cultural Press, p.139.

<sup>10</sup> - Edward Carr. (1980). What is History? Beirut: The Arab Institution for Studies and Publishing, p.97.

<sup>11</sup> - The same reference, p.98.

<sup>12</sup> - Edward Carr, previous reference, p.98.

<sup>13</sup> - Montesquieu. (1748). The Spirit of the Laws. Geneva: Barillot and Sons, p.78.

<sup>14</sup> - Ibn Khaldun, previous reference, p.69.

<sup>15</sup> - Muhammad Waqidi. (1990). The Rationality of History and the Rationality of Historicisation. Contemporary Arab Thought (82-83), pp.26-33.

<sup>16</sup> - Edward Carr, previous reference, p.97.

estimation of scientists from time to time". This new information may lead to a radical change in medicine or astronomy, but neither the bacteria nor the stars change with the change of their observers or their successors among humans.

But what is lacking in the knowledge of natural scientists will not affect the cause in the natural world, whereas in history its concept is variable, because it deals with the variable, which has deprived it of a precise and specific meaning, since there is no primary given from which we start the interpretation<sup>17</sup>.

For example, if the cause is traced back to the sources (the document), the knowledge of the cause will be partial and incomplete, because this datum (the document) has only a relative degree of objectivity, as a scientific credibility. We therefore conclude that the cause in history is related to the non-loss of sources.

For there is no absolute beginning, and one cannot assume the infinity of causes.

Ibn Khaldun took a big step in posing the problem of history as a special problem, lacking a realistic epistemological basis, and did not see the precedence of reality as an obstacle to the initiative of thought. He conceived the nature of the historical event and the training and education of the historian, and insisted on explanation as a necessary goal through the necessity of always searching for causes and reasons at every stage of investigation.

In this context, Ibn Khaldun says: "This thought perceives the order between events by nature or by convention. If one wants to bring about something, it is necessary to be aware of its cause, its reason, or its condition, which are generally its principles. For it does not exist except as a consequence of them, and it is not possible to make the preceding follow the succeeding or the succeeding precede the preceding"<sup>18</sup>.

Ibn Khaldun uses three terms to explain this: the cause (al-'illa), the reason (al-sabab) and the condition (al-shart). It is known that the cause is the source of the existence of a thing, the reason is what makes the thing to be, and the condition is how the thing is. He clearly understands that the 'why' questions are regressive and the 'how' questions are descriptive. He also recognises the difficulty of isolating the efficient cause of a historical event from the manner in which the historical event occurred<sup>19</sup>.

This is the meaning of the rational analysis that Ibn Khaldun tries to apply to historical reality: the inductive deduction of the laws governing the course of history from the historical events themselves.

mastering the greatest possible number of factors that can influence the development of society, and this can only be done through a comprehensive view of the structure of society, the patterns of life, and the aspects of human activity<sup>20</sup>.

History, in Ibn Khaldun's view, is pure information, and it needs a special standard and a special methodology, the cornerstone of which was the law of correspondence, which first requires looking at the human social organisation, which is 'imran (civilisation), and the purpose of this view is to derive what accompanies this society from conditions for itself and by virtue of its nature, "for every event, whether essential or accidental, must have a nature specific to it in itself and in the conditions that occur to it. ... its truthfulness and correctness must be considered in terms of correspondence, and therefore it is necessary to consider the possibility of its occurrence"<sup>21</sup>.

Also, The application of the principle of conformity has led to the discovery of social laws, in order to make them a correct standard by which historians can investigate the path of truth and correctness in what they transmit: "And if we do that, it will be a law for us to distinguish the right from the wrong in the news, and the truth from the lie, in a demonstrative way in which there is no room for doubt"<sup>22</sup>.

The convergence of intentions and causes in historical events is very useful in this context, because historical causes are often the result of deliberate human social actions<sup>23</sup>. Determining the intention behind an action and verifying its credibility is linked to an aspect of the cause that has led us to provide a convincing explanation of the context and agents that led to the action, and this has become crucial to our current understanding of historical causality. Twentieth-century historians testify that subsequent research in the social sciences has provided strong support for historical explanations based on tracing causal mechanisms<sup>24</sup>. This is something that the analytic philosophers of the 1960s failed to do.

The question of criticism in history thus seems, from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun, to be at the heart of the historical way of thinking - I mean the criticism of texts and their interrogation in the Khaldunian way to construct history and its rationality, which means that what is historical becomes rational by virtue of having become an actual event, i.e. the conformity of the historical event to the nature of human civilisation. This

<sup>17</sup>- Louis Gottschalk (n.d.). *How to Understand History, an Introduction to the Application of the Historical Method*. Cairo: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, p.244.

<sup>18</sup>- Ibn Khaldun, previous reference, p.976.

<sup>19</sup>- Nassif Nassar. (1981). *The realist thought of Ibn Khaldun, an analytical and dialectical interpretation of Ibn Khaldun's thought in its structure and meaning*. Beirut: Dar Al-Tali'ah for Printing and Publishing, p.141.

<sup>20</sup>- Omar Farroukh, previous reference, p.12.

<sup>21</sup>- Ibn Khaldun, previous reference, p.68.

<sup>22</sup>- The same reference, p.68.

<sup>23</sup>- Davidson Donald. (1963), *Actions, Reasons and Causes*, *Journal of Philosophy* 60(23), PP 685-700.

<sup>24</sup>- Daniel Little: *Philosophy of History* Stanford, translated by Tariq Al-Sulaiti, Al-Hikmah, 2017, p.25.

conformity becomes the a priori theoretical proof of the possibility of the historical facts that are the subject of historical research<sup>25</sup>.

The application of the principle of conformity reveals the rationality of history from another perspective, in the interconnectedness of its events and the exchange of influences, so that some of them can appear as the explanatory cause of others, if there is a temporal sequence. In other words, the causal connection between historical events, and this is the purpose of historiography and the essence of historical research from the perspective of "Ibn Khaldun". For the sense of possessing historical facts arises when they become part of a social and societal process that is causally connected.

However, according to the Moroccan historian "Abdullah al-Arawi", the view of historical rationality that "Ibn Khaldun" tried to give to history does not represent anything more than ready-made explanatory patterns to which the Arab and non-Arab historian resorts, "because it is not enough for someone to quote "Ibn Khaldun" for us to accept his explanation as the absolute truth"<sup>26</sup>.

This judgement by "Abdullah al-Arawi" on "Ibn Khaldun" does not mean that the Khaldunian explanation is invalid, but it may fit a particular case or phenomenon, but it does not explain every event in Moroccan history, as "Abdullah al-Arawi" goes on to say:

"We must remember that Ibn Khaldun was concerned with only one question: the question of the foundations of civilisation, society and the state...He is constantly on the borderline between history and non-history. He departs only slightly from non-history and does not delve deeply into history... so that the word "history" becomes... a series of news about successive events without definition or creativity, explained by the rules of the transition from pastoralism to agriculture within the framework of the disintegration of the nomadic tribe and its transformation into a settled clan... that is, the will of all is directed against entering the realm of history, where history means inequality, contradiction and conflict"<sup>27</sup>.

Historical causality is itself a proposition, since the researcher plays an important role in directing the idea of causality. It is not enough to simply list the causes, but rather to establish a system of causes that determines their relationship to each other, and perhaps to decide on the cause or some of the causes that should ultimately be considered the ultimate cause.

This is in accordance with the researcher's inclination to understand the past and to bring some order and unity to the chaos of events and the chaos of particular causes. However, it remains a fact that the historian works through simplification and also through the multiplicity of causes, and history progresses through this double context and apparent contradiction... This corresponds to the position of "Henri Poincaré" in the book "Science and Hypothesis": "That science and time progress together towards diversity and complexity and towards unity and simplicity, and that this dual and apparently contradictory process is a necessary condition of knowledge"<sup>28</sup>.

But do the causal expressions that explain human action imply a denial of human will in changing reality and the future, through another idea related to causality, the idea of "determinism"?

Earlier, we had a brief encounter with the Moroccan historian "Abdullah al-Arawi", who criticised the Khaldunian explanation, arguing that it is merely a pattern of explanation that focuses on one angle without the other angles of Moroccan history, and he even insisted that the Khaldunian explanation of Moroccan history is at its core a prior denial of the Moroccan collective will, for a collective goal and a conscious policy.

Here, all concern is focused on the continuity of the social structure and the preservation of the balance between the clans, not on progress and renewal<sup>29</sup>.

Professor Karl Popper, in his book "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", presented a new perspective on science in which the distinguishing feature of science is the ability to falsify its propositions.

The ability to falsify a scientific proposition lies in its continual vulnerability to confrontation with empirical facts, i.e. continual progress. Popper's philosophical formulation leads to an open society, open to opinions and alternative views. This makes it impossible to fit society into a totalitarian framework, a unified system and historical determinism. Popper refutes any claim to an inevitable course of history.

Thus Popper moves from the philosophy of science to the philosophy of history, politics and the open society through his works "The Open Society and Its Enemies" and "The Poverty of Historicism". The main targets of Popper's campaign were the determinist philosophies of Hegel and Marx, which he grouped under the term "historicism" - theories that consider history to be part of science, as well as those that sharply distinguish the two<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>25</sup>- Muhammad Waqidi, previous reference, p.27.

<sup>26</sup>- Abdullah Al-Aroui. (2002). Our culture in the light of history. Casablanca: The Arab Cultural Centre, p.39.

<sup>27</sup>- Abdullah Al-Aroui, previous reference, pp. 40-41.

<sup>28</sup>- Poincaré, H. (1986). Science and Hypothesis. Paris: Flammarion, p. 202.

<sup>29</sup>- Abdullah Al-Aroui, previous reference, p.41.

<sup>30</sup>- Edward Carr, previous reference, p.102.

Popper defines historicism as “a trend in the social sciences which takes historical prediction as its primary goal<sup>31</sup>”.<sup>32</sup> This implies that historical events do not occur arbitrarily, but to achieve a specific goal of progress, as seen in the historicist philosophies of Hegel, Marx and Plato.

For Popper, however, this causal explanation denies human free will and encourages historians to shirk their supposed moral duty to condemn the “Charlemagne’s, Napoleon’s and Stalin’s” of history<sup>33</sup>.

In his view, this is an absurdity and an inability to acknowledge the role of chance in history. For history has no purpose, nor does it have any meaning other than that which we impose upon it; it is no more than the sum of its individual events.

What distinguishes science is its technological and empirical character, not the holistic nature claimed by historicism. Consequently, the historicist approach as a comprehensive method is a sterile one, incapable of producing the results it promise<sup>34</sup>. In a sense, it confuses science and non-science. The concept of explanation in history cannot have the same status as in the natural sciences, for the historian operates from a perspective that is neither testable nor falsifiable - it is merely historical interpretation (Carr, 1980, p. 153).

However, Karl Popper’s insistence that anything is possible in the realm of human affairs is, as Edward Carr observes, “an empty or false insistence, for the self-evident proposition that everything has a cause is one of the conditions of our ability to understand what is going on around us”<sup>35</sup>. For the historian, like the ordinary man, believes that human actions have ascertainable causes, and history becomes impossible if we do not establish this condition.

The specific function of the historian is to investigate these causes without denying free will, and similarly the historian is not overly concerned with the question of determinism, because in reality historians do not assume that events were predetermined before they happened. They often discuss the different paths available to the actors in the narrative, even as they rightly explain why a particular alternative was ultimately chosen over the other<sup>36</sup>.

The accusation of determinism in history does not mean that the same historical events occur at the same time and in the same place, but rather refers to the general, repeatable human phenomena that can also be predicted - i.e. it only means that the convergence of the factors that led one to expect this event was extremely strong, because nothing in history is predetermined except in a formal sense, and its substance is that a difference in the initial causes alone would have been sufficient to change the event<sup>37</sup>.

Historical knowledge therefore has limits that only serve to characterise it as approximate, because history is a process of selection based on criteria of historical significance. Just as the historian selects from the infinite number of facts those that are relevant to his hypothesis, so he extracts from the succession of multiple causes and effects only those that have historical significance<sup>38</sup>.

Then there is the individuality of the cases in history, which opens up a wide field for contingencies and possibilities to find a place to breathe.

Moreover, causality in history takes on a hypothetical character, shifting from scientific causality to rational causality, because every process is represented in the mind and there is no possibility of applying causal analysis practically. Interpretation becomes a matter of uncovering accidental causes and true causes, and thus the process of interpretation in history is linked to value judgments and teleology, because the historian cannot encompass all historical causes, but only a part of them, so the existence of chance “Le Hasard” and possibility in history doom this attempt to failure.

Henri Berr defines chance as “the unexpected, in which causality is absent, it is the contingent event whose causes we ignore<sup>39</sup>”, such as Antonius’ infatuation with Cleopatra, the monkey’s bite that killed Alexander, Lenin’s death, They all changed the course of history, and it is useless to ignore them in the process of historical explanation, even if they do not fit into any rational explanation of history or the meaningful sequence of causes adopted by the historian. But they had consequences, even if they cannot be generalised, and since they are truly unique causes, they teach no lesson and lead to no conclusions<sup>40</sup>.

Chance is the strange negative behaviour that is alien to order and system. It may happen that a person knows the reason and motives for his behaviour, but does not expect its results - in both cases it is the intersection of two independent series. But the events of chance, some of them receive attention and concern, those that play a role in changing the course of events, while others receive no attention from the historian.

But the knowledge of chance and its relationship to determinism and order is the true task of the historian. We cannot simply accept that history is a series of coincidences, as some scholars have suggested when defining

<sup>31</sup>- The same reference, p.102.

<sup>32</sup>- Karl Popper (1992). *The Poverty of Historicism*. (Abdel Hamid Sabry, translator) Cairo: Dar Al-Saqi, p.13.

<sup>33</sup>- Edward Carr, previous reference, p.103.

<sup>34</sup>- Karl Popper, previous reference, p.75.

<sup>35</sup>- Edward Carr, previous reference, pp.104-105.

<sup>36</sup>- The same reference, p.107.

<sup>37</sup>- The same reference, p.107.

<sup>38</sup>- Edward Carr, previous reference, p.118.

<sup>39</sup>- Berr, H. (1953). *Synthesis in history, its relation to the general synthesis*. Paris: Albin Michel, p.56.

<sup>40</sup>- Edward Carr, previous reference, p.119-120.



the role of chance in history. Rather, we must strive “to solve the question of chance in history within a completely different system of ideas<sup>41</sup>”. We always need the efforts of historians to get as close as possible to their subject, the past, and to give meaning to the process of human life over time. For in the idea that there is a purpose, it is precisely this that provides the starting point for our treatment of the question of causality in history, and this necessarily involves value judgments, since the historian’s mind remains the measure of accidental causes and true causes. The legitimacy of interpretation in history is derived from the meaning and purpose of this system.

It is the realisation of man’s will and the establishment of his aims as a conscious being capable of presenting his positions with complete rationality.

This is the view of the followers of hermeneutic philosophy, increasingly influenced by postmodernism and French literary theory, and the writings of Hayden White in “Metahistory” in 1973, as well as the writings of Louis Mink in the same period (1978/1966), which had a clear influence on philosophers of history who emphasised the rhetoric of historical writing and not the reduction of historical narratives to a series of facts. This led to the marginalisation of the natural sciences as an epistemology for historical explanation and construction, as well as the positivist school. Historical narratives have received a great deal of attention compared to causal explanations in history, which has highlighted the subjective aspect of understanding history by accepting multiple interpretations at the expense of other concepts such as objectivity and historicity against the universal. For human consciousness is only a historical product and the essential work of the historian is to collect the views of the actors of the past and to integrate them into a whole, as Pampa Léon mentioned in his book “The Nature of Man and Historical Knowledge, Hume, Hegel and Vico 1990”<sup>42</sup>.

However, the historical narrative does not provide the whole solution to the problem of interpretation in history, and not all historical knowledge is expressed through narratives.

For example, demographic, economic and structural change requires a causal explanation of the course of these transformations and developments.

### Conclusion:

The conclusion is that the interpretation of history is in a debate between determinism as a qualitative concept in history, as it is associated with the notions of chance and individuality, which make history a stage for various philosophical, theological and materialistic interpretations, etc., and the concept of freedom, which is synonymous with responsible rational behaviour.

The search for causes in history is directly or indirectly linked to values because of the dual function of history - it enhances our understanding of the past in the light of the present, and our understanding of the present in the light of the past, in addition to the link between causality and explanation. This means that there is no equivalence between the rationality of history and the rationality of historiography, and this confirms the limits of knowledge in history, but it does not diminish its objective value and necessity, which arise from the surrounding causes and the effort of the historian himself in selecting and arranging them according to a particular perspective and narrative.

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