Nationalism As A Vehicle For Modern Organizational Revolution

Ángel Benjamín Robles Montoya[1*], Y Maribel Martínez Ruiz[2]

[1*]Actualmente Postdoctorante en Inteligencia Artificial para la Administración Pública en el Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública (INAP-México). Doctor en Administración Pública por el Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública (INAP-México). Presidente del Colegio Nacional de Economíista (México). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-7762-1130; Correo: volveraganar@gmail.com.
[2]Doctoranda en Administración Pública por el Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-5144-4666; Correo: maribelmruiz@hotmail.com.

ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
	The consolidation of the Absolutist State is analyzed up to the emergence of Enlightenment thought and major revolutionary milestones. Nationalism sparks an intellectual debate between those who consider it an ideology and those who see it as merely a historical moment, with Kant in the midst of the debate. The Modern State is solidified thanks to the nationalist influence of motivations for competitive reordering, which ensures sovereignty and provides a legal-scientific framework for its reproduction. The Modern State fosters four types of societies: statist, liberal, corporatist, and segmented. **Keywords:** Nationalism, Modern State, organizations, ideology.

Introduction

The objective of this essay is to explain the process by which the Modern State is gestated from the catalyst that nationalism represented, through a dual process that involves the evolution of Enlightenment thought and technological innovation. To approach the task, a first part is proposed where the transformation of the Roman reminiscent legacy in Christian culture as a collector of the epistemological knowledge of the administration of society is analyzed.

At the end of the historical account, the second section presents a debate on the ontology of nationalism; The underlying question is whether this constitutes an ideology or whether it is simply a historical context. In a third part, we return to a neo-institutional analysis, with which it is defined that nationalism served as a vehicle for the fulfillment of different organizational motivators of society in the context of change between the Absolutist State and the Modern State. Finally, in a fourth space, the organizational evolution is accounted for, which reflects the emergence of four organizational social models in Western culture.

1. Western isomorphism

The development of Western institutions largely retains direct elements of Hellenic cultures and later Roman syncretism. From the birth of Christianity to the fall of Rome in 476 AD by barbarian tribes, it does not occur as it is thought, a *dystopia* where an extreme and immediate decadence of Roman culture reigns, it is rather a process of gradual assimilation, although obligatory.

According to Miller (1989: 95) the barbarian tribes initially wanted to belong to the Romans, they wanted to enjoy citizenship and their way of life. And Machiavelli says in the *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy* (2020 [1531]), that indeed the Romans had a good system of assimilation with the teaching of a language, laws, architecture, knowledge in medicine and technologies; which was increasing with each expansion. But, as the Romans stopped doing the tasks of assimilation, they generated internal social ruptures, one of them was Christianity itself, which for centuries was repressed.

Bureaucratization, understood as an obsolescence of the processes of maintaining the system (Peeters, 2020), was palpable with unsafe roads and ruined roads, in addition to anti-popular measures such as the segregationism of the last conquered peoples (Miller, 1989: 115). Meanwhile, the wastefulness and immoral disfigurements of the ruling class were known. The peoples far from the capital lost faith in Romanism, to the point that they not only allowed themselves to be conquered by the barbarians but also supported them to advance.

When Rome falls, there is a lack of control within the former territories because there is no longer public security. This phenomenon is described by Pérez Rojas (2017) in his work on the powers that be, as the beginning of feudalism; a setback in the historical evolution of the State. The people had to reorganize around, not the Platonic philosopher king, but the strongest and often most bloodthirsty who could protect them, those ferocious individuals become the feudal lords, and they are the ones who organize the erection of the walls. In the midst of confusion and with a society immersed in ignorance, because education also collapsed, Catholicism emerged as the collector of Roman knowledge.

 According to Leo Huberman (1997 [1936]: 26), if it were not for the Catholic Church, a large part of Western knowledge would possibly have been lost. It is the Church that preserves writing and with that rescues administrative knowledge, keeps the record of tithes, those who are born and those who die, inheritances, medicine, architecture, etc. The church arrives at the fiefdoms not only with the Bible in hand but with all this knowledge and settles within the walls. The feudal lords assigned them more chores, they ran orphanages, hospitals, hostels, cemeteries and often justice. The church becomes the first systematized Western franchise based on the pyramidal-hierarchical structural model. From there, all the organizations copied the same pattern, the same form; that is why, under the neo-institutionalist approach, it is said that the Western system followed an *isomorphic pattern* (Jepperson and Meyer in Powell and DiMaggio, comp., 1999 [1991]: 267).

In this way, Christianity became the predominant public culture, according to Mann (1986). The Church would be the first promoter of political organization and because of its stability, its system allowed the restitution of commercial exchange. What little remained of the Roman Empire ended with the fall of Byzantium in 1453, but by that time Western feudalism already had a good collection of basic and rudimentarily structured organizations, based not only on the ethical but also on the epistemological influence of the Church. A Christian religious capitalism already existed, and since private organizations were not yet allowed or existed, then capital formed the "public house" from offices and subsidiary agencies of the sovereign or the Church, thus competitiveness emerged as an organizational characteristic (Coleman, 1974: 27).

One of the first states formed was that of France, which in short brought together several cities around one of the fiercest feudal lords with the most economic and military resources (Clovis of the Merovingians in 751); this order was succeeded by different lineages, but under the same centralist model. This is the model followed by absolutist states between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1576 Jean Bodin's *De la República* appeared, where he clarified what sovereignty means, which is the *"supreme power*", the absolute and perpetual power of a State (Bobbio, 1996 [1976]: 80 and 81). At that time sovereignty will fall to the sovereign, the king, who makes the final decision in all matters of the state. Church and State, both ruled and thus social life was reorganized around sovereignty and identity.

In 1651 Hobbes published *Leviathan* (2006 [1651]: 173) and the idea that sovereignty is associated with the use of force to preserve the security of subjects as the highest purpose of the State bursts in. Years later, Locke spoke of civil government, and in 1690 he became one of the greatest critics of paternalistic government, in which the sovereign treated the subject as a minor. Bobbio (1994 [1985]: 105) defines this as the clear description of despotic government, where subjects are really slaves to whom no rights are recognized.

The demand for security and civility are two sides of the same coin. Fiefdoms are broken, people no longer fit on the walls; The farther the people are from the feudal lord, the more they suffer from insecurity, but the more commercial benefits they obtain. The fiefs become burgs and the bourgeoisie demand that the king, the prince or the nobleman in charge provide them with services, the most pressing is security or they will hire their own mercenaries (Hobsbawn, 2001 and Pérez Rojas, 2017). The nobles, instead of providing security, ignore or repress the bourgeoisie. While the miserable die of starvation in the streets of Paris, it is known that Louis XVI has allocated money and troops for the resistance of the Thirteen American Colonies and the Revolution breaks out in 1789. Bourgeois liberalism stands as the ideology of transformation of the Enlightenment, and the two great milestones of rupture are identified in these two linked events: the independence of the Thirteen Colonies and the French Revolution (Ritzer, 2001 [1993]).

2. Nationalism: Ideology or Social Context?

Possibly the first theorists on nationalism are John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton who in the second part of the nineteenth century began to focus on this subject in their essays. For his part, Mill associated nationalism with participation and democracy, remember that he is one of the first exponents of social liberalism (Strauss and Cropsey, 2001 [1963]: 749). While Lord Acton (1999 [1862]) warned of the possibility of nationalism becoming a new despotic mechanism, since individual freedom is not associated with the equality of persons; nationalism was associated with the "general will." This bifurcation on the critique of nationalism persists to this day, for some it is considered a modern ideology, while for others it is even a reactionary ballast against cosmopolitanism.

According to Gellner (1983), nationalism has accompanied practically the entire process of Western modernization, and has contributed to uniting societies; Certainly, he recognizes that during the different stages resistances have been activated but that these have led to cultural changes that have ultimately given way to union. From this perspective, the crossing of traditional societies has given way to the massification and concretization of modern societies. For him, nationalism is the result of a process, not an ideology.

For his part, Elie Kedourie (1994 [1960]) considers that nationalism has been an artifact used for manipulative purposes to artificially unite or separate societies. Kedourie's critique goes so far as to point out that

nationalism is a disease of the modern world. He considered Kant to be a promoter of nationalism as an ideology; something that Gellner will refute because for him Kant had been a promoter of cosmopolitanism. Kedourie considers it a fallacy that society was destined to be artificially separated into nations, and that for each nation a state with a specific territory should be born. In Kant's concept of *perpetual peace* , Kedourie finds an invitation that peace is achieved when each nation has its own space for self-determination, it is then a unifying ideology. For him, considering nationalism as an ideology had a negative meaning, in the sense that ideologies as factors of cultural reproduction suppress the reflexivity of individuals and end up being dangerous. In the same logic as Lord Acton, Kedourie conceives that nationalism is a key ideology in the process of modernization. This is a vision similar to Berlin's (1960) critique of Rousseau, whom he also considers to be a promoter of nationalism, who under his fixation on the collectivism of the "general will" was also a totalitarian in his eyes.

According to Berlin (1998), Kant goes from defending the individual to turning freedom into a collective subject, the reason, according to him, is not in the search for a universal value but in his own Protestant notion of what freedom based on independence should be. Thus the moral development of the individual becomes the morality of the nation and, paradoxically, ends up requiring the individual to submit to that "higher will."

In his case, Gellner (1983: 125) says that nationalism cannot be considered an ideology, because it did not have an agitator or leader like Christianity or Marxism. For him, nationalism was a culture that had been normalized among the masses, and it was only later that philosophers began to appropriate the term. In his opinion, if nationalism is considered a creed, then it is made to destroy; however, he disagrees with Kedourie's frontal attack because it does not help to clarify that it is a process, which was most likely inevitable and not optional, as he proposed.

So, for Gellner, nationalism is not an ideological doctrine, but a social reality that occurred without a leader to blame, it was the result of a context of Western history. In this way he defends that Kant was not an ideologue of nationalism, because although it is true that the German philosopher has developed the concept of self-determination in the development of morality, he never goes so far as to say that this self-determination can be attributed to a particular ethnicity or culture. Gellner disassociates the argument that moral self-determination has given rise to national self-determination.

3. Nationalism and modernity

For Anthony D. Smith (2001: 302), the study of nationalisms has delineated three antinomies, that is, contrasting ideas that go hand in hand diachronically. First, "the essence" of the nation in the face of the possibility of a "fabricated reality"; second, the longevity of the nation before its appearance in the Middle Ages; and, third, national culture *versus* the imposition of political goals. Thus, nationalism considered as an ideology or as a simple contextual fact, serves as a vehicle for transition to the revolution that was being observed in the background: the organizational revolution. In this way, it is convenient to distinguish three motivations that help to spread nationalism with respect to modern purposes.

1) The motivation for a change towards a competitive system. One of the fundamental pillars in understanding the emergence of the modern nation-state is the notion of modernity as a process of social and cultural transformation. Giddens (1990) argues that modernity is characterized by the rupture with traditions and the emergence of new forms of social and political organization. From this perspective, nationalism promotes a process of ideological transformation that includes the abandonment of feudal and hierarchical structures in favor of systems based on reason, individuality, and the search for empirical knowledge.

Thus, the modern nation state arises as a response to the need to establish political structures consistent with the emerging values and principles of modernity. "*(P)or modern political organization we refer to the system of rules that confers social authority in pursuit of collective ends, establishing agents of regulation and collective intervention*" (Swanson, 1971).

With the migration from the absolutist State to the modern State, a mutation of organizational forms was generated, among which private organization was born as a result of the immediate process of the Industrial Revolution. These new sociological realities entail new psychological realities that in Anglo-Saxon countries, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom, lead to a logic of competitiveness (Hurst, 1982; Miller, 1989; and Gartner, 2005). This logic will be imitated as soon as the new reconstituted states finish their revolutions.

2) The motivation for a system that gives stability to sovereignty. According to Jepperson and Meyer, "*the modern organization is a creature of public authority...*" (in Powell and Dimaggio, comps., 1999 [1991]: 263). In addition to the discourse of sovereign determination outlined by Bodin, the perspective of the State, developed by Tilly (1990), highlights the importance of war and coercion in the consolidation of state institutions, very much in line with what was stated by Hobbes (2006 [1651]) and later by Weber (2002 [1922]: 736): "(...) only the bureaucratic army has made possible the organization of permanent professional armies *such as those that have been necessary for the pacification of large states*."

Let us remember that one of the criticisms of nationalism by Kedourie (1994 [1960]) refers to the concept of *Kantian perpetual peace* , by which he infers that each people has the right to safeguard its own territory. In this logic, Tilly (1990) argues that competition for resources and power led to the creation of centralized states with the capacity to collect taxes and maintain a professional army, key elements for the consolidation of control and authority in a defined territory.

The aspiration to regulate and "reproduce" power relations. According to Gramsci, the modern state is an expression of the hegemony of a ruling class that manages to impose its vision of the world and its interests through coercion and consensus (Hoare and Nowell, eds., 1971). Gramsci stresses the importance of culture and education in consolidating the hegemony of a class, which influences the formation of a national identity and the construction of a sense of belonging to the political community.

In institutional terms, the genesis of the modern national state is reflected in the consolidation of centralized governmental structures and the creation of political institutions that define authority and power relations (Altamirano and Martínez, 2011). Skocpol (1979) analyzes the formation of the state through the lens of social revolutions and structural changes that resulted in the emergence of new political regimes. For Skocpol, revolutions are catalysts for profound institutional transformations that shape modern nation states.

According to Gil Villegas (2000 [1993]) and Pardo (2016), public administration during the nineteenth century has a perspective oriented towards legal logic. According to Guerrero (2004), administration in the Absolutist State was studied under the label of "*chamber sciences and police sciences*", while since the appearance of the contributions of Charles-Jean Bonnin -1808- it will be known as public administration. The Law and its legal systems then emerge as the molds or recipes of what the public thing should be. That is why Ashworth (1975: 94 and 95) discovers that in the appearance of new organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom, they tend to be very similar, because the laws standardize their physiognomy; For this reason, limited liability companies (in the Hispanic world, corporations) also have an exponential and to a certain extent orderly growth in such countries.

4. Four organizational consequences

For Jepperson and Meyer, the nineteenth century implies the revolution of organizations and it must be accepted that these are systems of mass power, insofar as they are mobilizers of resources (Powell and Dimaggio, comps, 1999 [1991]: 270 and 273). As Gramsci and Marx warned, this new modern structuring gives way to a large part of the bourgeoisie that owns capital, becoming in turn part of the elite of the new institutionalized authority, says Lindblom (1977). Thus, all the new societies resulting from the modern State will rationalize the sovereignty and functions of the collective. But, they are not going to do it in the same way, according to Jepperson and Meyer four families are going to be configured, which although they are heirs of Christian isomorphism, they are going to be distinguished from each other by their purposes and structures: statist society, liberal society, corporatist society and segmented society.

Statist Society: In the statist society – the direct heir of the French Revolution – the State plays a central and dominant role in social and economic organization. In his case, sovereignty rests with "*the will of society*". The government has significant control over the planning and distribution of resources, as well as over key decision-making in the economy and other aspects of social life. State institutions are responsible for directing and regulating a large part of social and economic activities. Examples of statist societies include France and the French-speaking parts of Belgium and Canada.

Liberal Society: There prevails a focus on individual freedom and the autonomy of social actors because they have a Protestant heritage. Sovereignty rests on the will of individuals. The state has a limited role in regulating the economy and in the daily lives of citizens, allowing individuals and private organizations to make decisions and actively participate in the economic and social sphere. The free market and competition are fundamental aspects of liberal society, and the ability of people to pursue their own interests and goals with minimal state intervention is valued. Democratic and free-market-based societies are examples of liberal societies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the English part of Canada.

Corporatist society: The corporatist society is related to French statism, but with the variant in its philosophy, since it has a more functionalist character. Sovereignty rests with the collective. There is close collaboration and coordination between the State, companies and organized interest groups. Social actors, such as trade unions and business associations, play an active role in policy-making and decision-making (Muñoz, 2024). In this context, it seeks to balance the interests of different groups and sectors through negotiation and cooperation, which can lead to greater stability and social cohesion. Examples of corporatist societies can be found in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Nordic countries.

Segmented Society: This is a society familiar with French statism but with uncertainties or experimental organizational systems. In these realities, the State is detached from society; society does not feel part of the State, to the extent that sometimes society believes that the government *is* the State, as O'Donnell would later explain with delegative democracy (1994). Social organization is characterized by deep divisions and inequalities between different groups or segments of the population. These segments can be defined by factors such as ethnicity, religion, social class, or other group identities. At first the segmented nations were considered Spain and Italy, however they are increasingly similar to statist societies. Today, clear examples of segmented societies can be found in South America, Southeast Asia, and former African colonies.

Conclusions

First conclusion, nationalism served as a vehicle for organizational change between the Absolutist State and the Modern State. As observed, Western culture was based on the Christian isomorphism from which the Absolutist State was born. Innovations in enlightened liberal thought and in production technologies end up

generating a social class – bourgeoisie – that will be the main promoter of revolutionary ruptures and nationalist movements.

Second, nationalism synthesized a series of functional motivations, which end up fragmenting Western culture into four large organizational families. Among the debate to define nationalism as an ideology or as a mere social context, we can identify different motivators of change: the establishment of competitive systems, the stability of sovereignty or Kantian perpetual peace, as well as the regulation and reproduction of the new system of power. Finally, the four new organizational realities are identified as statist, liberal, corporatist and segmented societies.

Bibliography

1. Acton, L. (1999 [1862]). Ensayos sobre la libertad, el poder y la religión. CEPC. España.
2. Altamirano, M. y Martínez, A. (2011). El método comparado y el neo-institucionalismo como marco metodológico para la investigación en las Ciencias Sociales. *Mundo Siglo XXI*, CIECAS-IPN, Núm. 25, Vol. VII, 2011, pp. 55-63.
3. Ashworth, W. (1975). A short history of the international economy since 1850. Longman. Reino Unido.
4. Berlin, I. (1960). Nationalism. Oxford Magazine, 1. Reino Unido.
5. Bobbio, N. (1994 [1985]). Estado, gobierno y sociedad. FCE. México.
6. Bobbio, N. (1996 [1976]). La teoría de las formas de gobierno en la historia del pensamiento político. FCE. México.
7. Coleman, J. S. (1974). Power and the structure of society. Norton. EEUU.
8. Gartner, J. D. (2005). The hypomanic edge. The link between craziness and success in America. Picador. EEUU.
9. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell.
10. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press. Reino Unido. https://voidnetwork.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/The-Consequences-of-Modernity-by-Anthony-Giddens.pdf
11. Gil Villegas, F. (2000 [1993]). "Los fundamentos políticos de la teoría de la administración pública." En Méndez, J. L. Lecturas básicas de administración y políticas públicas. El Colegio de México. México.
12. Guerrero, O. (2004). Estudio Introductorio al libro Principios de Administración Pública de Charles-Jean Bonnin. Fondo de Cultura Económica. México
13. Hoare, Q., y Nowell Smith, G., eds. (1971). Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Lawrence and Wishart. Reino Unido.
14. Hobbes, T. (2006 [1651]). Leviatán. FCE. México.
15. Hobsbawn, E. (2001). Rebeldes primitivos. Estudio sobre las formas arcaicas de los movimientos sociales en los siglos XIX y XX. Crítica. España.
16. Huberman, L. (1997 [1936]). Los bienes terrenales del hombre. Nuestro tiempo. México.
17. Hurst, J. W. (1982). Law and markets in the United States history. University of Wisconsin Press. EEUU.
18. Kedourie, E. (1994 [1960]). Nationalism. Blackwell. Reino Unido.
19. Lindblom, C. E. (1977). Politics and markets. Basic Books. EEUU.
20. Mann, M. (1986). The sources of social power. Vol 1. Cambridge University Press. EEUU.
21. Maquiavelo, N. (2020 [1531]). Discursos sobre la primera década de Tito Livio. Alianza. España.
22. Miller, L. M. (1989). Barbarians to bureaucrats. Fawcett. EEUU.
23. Muñoz, A. (2024). El sindicalismo magisterial disidente y la izquierda partidista en México: una relación sin compromisos (1979-2024). *Revueltas. Revista Chilena de Historia Social Popular*, 05 (10): 200-225.
24. O'Donnell, G. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, Volume 5, Number 1, January: 55-69. John Hopkins University Press. EEUU.
25. Pardo, M. del C. (2016). Una introducción a la administración pública. El Colegio de México. México.
26. Peeters, R. (2020). "La burocracia y sus defectos", en R. Peeters y F. Nieto Morales (eds.), La máquina de la desigualdad. Una exploración de los costos y las causas de las burocracias de baja confianza, CIDE – El Colegio de México. México.
27. Pérez Rojas, G. A. (2017). "Poderes fácticos y globalización," en Ayala, F., y Mora, S., Léxicos de los grupos de poder: 163 a 183. UNAM. México. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/373019307_Poderes_facticos_y_globalizacion
28. Powell, W.W. y Dimaggio, P.J. comps. (1999 [1991]). El nuevo institucionalismo en el análisis organizacional. FCE, El Colegio Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Administración Públicas, UAEM. México.
29. Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815805
30. Smith, A. D. (2001). Nacionalismo y modernidad. Istmo. España.
31. Strauss, L., y Cropsey, J. (2001 [1963]). Historia de la filosofía política. FCE. México.
32. Swanson, G. (1971). An organization analysis of collectivities. American Sociological Review. 36: 607-623. EEUU.
33. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Blackwell. https://pages.ucsd.edu/~bslantchev/courses/ps240/06%20Domestic%20Organizations%20and%20Int

ernational%20Behavior/Tilly%20-
%20Coercion,%20capital%20and%20European%20states%20[Ch%201,3,6].pdf

34. Weber, M. (2002 [1922]). Economía y sociedad. FCE. México.