The Metaphysics of Self Negation: G.R. Malkani and Schopenhauer on The Idea of Suicide

Abstract

The phenomenon of suicide has been a subject of philosophical reflection across cultures, often treated through the lenses of religion, morality, law, and existential choice. This paper explores the metaphysics of self-negation through a comparative study of G.R. Malkani and Arthur Schopenhauer on the problem of suicide. While both philosophers recognize the profound existential weight of suicide, their interpretations diverge in striking ways, shaped by their broader metaphysical commitments. Schopenhauer, grounded in his doctrine of the will-to-live, views suicide not as a genuine negation of the will but as an act that paradoxically affirms it. For him, suicide merely rejects the conditions of life without overcoming the metaphysical essence of existence. True self-negation, in his system, can only be achieved through ascetic resignation and the denial of the will itself. By contrast, Malkani, a modern Indian philosopher, situates suicide within the context of individual freedom and moral autonomy. Through close textual analysis of Schopenhauer and Malkani’s Opinion on suicide, the paper highlights the metaphysical concern between life as a blind striving and life as a value-laden project. It demonstrates how Schopenhauer’s pessimism leads to a rejection of suicide as metaphysical liberation, whereas Malkani’s existential humanism opens space for a more affirmative recognition of the individual’s right to self-negation. Ultimately, the comparison reveals how Eastern and Western philosophical encounters on the theme of suicide enrich our understanding of freedom, value, and the limits of human existence.